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The Meaning of Deserved Punishment:
An Essay on Choice, Character, and Responsibilityt
SAMuEL H. PILLSBURY*
For if justice and righteousness perish, human life would no longer have
any value in the world.'
I was a couple years out of college, working in the South as a newspaper
reporter when I first confronted the question of deserved punishment.
Assigned to cover state court, I reported on many criminal cases, but only
one really got to me. It raised in disturbing fashion the problem of justice
in criminal law.
The facts were horrific. A father was convicted of the terrible abuse of
his four children, abuse so severe that it killed two of them and left another
battered and nearly blind. During a six-month period when his wife-who
had been the main target of his abuse-was in jail, the heavy-set man with
a brutal temper kicked, punched, and slapped his children, who ranged
from three to eleven years old. To punish them, he jammed their small
heads in a flushing toilet; he beat and kicked them, breaking their limbs
and causing internal injuries; he scraped his fingernails on the insides of
their mouths; and on and on. Two of the children died of the abuse.
Finally, the eldest son escaped and the father fled the city, leaving his
youngest daughter at a hospital with two dollars, her teddy bear, and a
note pinned to her clothes bearing the name and telephone number of her
grandmother. 2
At the time I was influenced by the liberal creed of the sixties, which
viewed punishment with great suspicion, but as I listened to this tale of
horrors, so much worse than any fiction, I thought surely these acts deserved
severe punishment. Surely if anyone deserved the death penalty it must be
this Ernest John Dobbert, Jr.'
f © Copyright 1992 by Samuel H. Pillsbury.
* Professor of Law and Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. My thanks go
to Elyn Saks, Larry Solum, and Tom Morawetz for their critiques of earlier drafts of this
paper and especially to Peter Arenella, who in his work and careful criticisms has helped me
enormously, especially in the area of moral agency. The fact that we disagree about critical
issues has only made our discussions more fruitful. I would also like to thank research
assistants Michael Dibb and Ruth Pinkel for their efforts.
1. I. KANT, THE PHILosoPHY OF LAW 196 (W. Hastie trans. 1887).
2. This account is drawn from newspaper stories. For a summary, see Ernest John
Dobbert, Jr., Jacksonville J., Feb. 2, 1982, at B1.
3. The reported decisions in the case include: Dobbert v. State, 328 So. 2d 433 (Fla.
1976) (affirming conviction); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977) (affirming conviction);
Dobbert v. State, 375 So. 2d 1069 (Fla. 1979) (affirming resentencing).
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Then I met Dobbert's defense attorney, 4 one of the most perceptive
observers of the criminal justice system I have known, and heard the
testimony offered at Dobbert's resentencing hearing. The defendant had
himself had been abused as a child. His father had emotionally and
physically degraded him. He so feared his father that, once, to prevent him
from learning about a bad grade, Dobbert, Jr. cut the telephone wires to
the house. The defense evidence suggested that, in his own way, Dobbert,
Jr. loved his children but was caught in a cycle of abuse far beyond his
power to control. In fact, in prison he had shown himself to be a peaceful,
even kind, person.
The question of why and when punishment is deserved goes to the heart
of the modern debate over criminal justice. Although as a society we often
try to avoid the question, either by assuming the validity of current practices
or by emphasizing the utilitarian alms of punishment, justice requires an
answer to the mystery of individual desert. How is it that Ernest John
Dobbert, Jr. deserved severe punishment, when his actions may have stemmed
from a background he never chose?
In this Essay I provide a practical but provisional answer to this question,
one that largely defends the law's current approach to criminal responsibility.
My answer is provisional because it does not address the central problem
of free will. I do not-and cannot-resolve whether persons freely choose
their actions despite the unchosen influence of genetics, environment, and
chance. Instead, I offer a kind of practical compatibilism, a way of
evaluating the justness of punishment in the face of metaphysical doubt.
In the first part of the Essay, I frame the issue of criminal responsibility.
After a brief look at the importance and difficulty of the free will problem,
I argue for a pragmatic approach. Regardless of the arguments that can be
mounted against it, responsibility for choice is fundamental to the human
condition; we cannot do without it. Thus, instead of asking whether we
can prove the metaphysics of responsibility for choice, we may ask what
our commitment to such responsibility entails.
The main subject of this Essay is a familiar one in the literature of
criminal law: the definition of the basic elements of responsibility for serious
criminal offenses.5 The traditional approach of criminal law asserts three
basic requirements: that the offender's choice be intentional, 6 rational, and
4. William P. White, Chief Assistant Public Defender, Duval County, Florida.
5. I limit myself to considering what punishment is deserved for serious offenses-those
criminal acts that involve culpable violations of another's autonomy through violence or deceit.
That is, I am interested in the punishment of those harmful acts that almost all persons would
call criminal. American criminal law extends to many more acts than this, and punishment
for these offenses raises questions which I do not consider here.
6. Here I use intentional in the philosophic sense to designate a culpable mental state. I
do not mean to limit it to what is often described as purposeful action. The term should be
seen to include all mental states generally employed in the criminal law. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02 (1980).
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uncoerced. I call this the chosen-action model of criminal responsibility.
Modem commentators generally agree that the elements of chosen action
are necessary to just punishment; they disagree on whether these elements
are sufficient. In recent years, many have argued for additional responsibility
requirements based on various conceptions of moral character. The argu-
ments fall into three general categories: what I call the causal, the repre-
sentative action, and the moral capacity approaches. In the first part of the
Essay, I briefly review each of these approaches and conclude that the
moral capacity model presents the most serious challenge to the traditional
model.
In the second part of the Essay, I return to the larger question of
responsibility for choice and offer a pragmatic explanation and justification
for our commitment to it. In short, I suggest that our deep commitment
to responsibility stems from our effort to find meaning in life. Starting
with the assumption that life has meaning, we see that our most important
endeavors aim at supplying meaning by connecting individual actions to
contexts of greater value. Responsibility for choice provides the essential
link between persons and value. In particular, moral responsibility allows
us to construct a normative order in a world otherwise indifferent to human
norms. I apply this approach to criminal justice in the last part of this
essay. I contend that punishment is deserved when necessary to defend basic
human value. In punishing according to deontologic principles, we defend
the moral values that criminal offenses demean. We engage in a dialogue
about basic value with those persons who choose to challenge our funda-
mental moral scheme. This explanation provides a practical justification for
deserved punishment by tying it to the essential task of finding meaning in
life. It also provides a new definition of criminal responsibility. In addition
to the requirements of chosen action, the offender must have had some
minimal experience as a feeling, rational chooser. This package of require-
ments allows us to read the offender's action as a challenge to basic human
value. We see that the offender is making choices about meaning for
himself, choices that implicate our own vision of meaning based on moral
values.
The defense-of-value approach conflicts with the most important aspects
of character theories of responsibility. Most importantly, it rejects. the
argument of moral capacity proponents that to be criminally responsible
the offender must have a demonstrated capacity for empathy. I argue that
while it may be true that persons who do not feel for others cannot-
without help-have moral concern, this does not excuse their actions. In
making moral judgments we assess the actor's moral motivation or its lack.
We may concede that Dobbert's attacks on his children stemmed from a
variety of unchosen influences and that, given his character at the time, he
could not have done otherwise, yet he still deserved punishment. We say
this because he still chose to attack our basic moral values.
1992]
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The defense-of-value approach undercuts the easy assumptions of moral
superiority that deontologic views of punishment often inspire. It should
make us realize that we punish persons for deeds "we" might have done
in their situations.7 We also see that in punishing we do not-or should
not-condemn the offender as a person. Even while punishing the offender's
action, we should value the offender as a person. Any other approach
violates the moral basis of punishment. Most fundamentally, the defense-
of-value approach does not contend that the wrongdoer chose to be a bad
person; it only asserts that the wrongdoer chose to disregard our concept
of basic human value. The approach reveals the potentially tragic nature of
punishment.
I. DEFINING THE IssuE
When we call punishment deserved, we mean that punishment depends
on the person's choice to do wrong and not on the consequences that flow
from punishment. 8 We judge according to the person's responsible choice
to harm another. The critical question for determining deserved punishment,
therefore, is what kind of choice supports criminal responsibility.
I begin my look at deserved punishment with the metaphysics of free
will. After a brief and inconclusive examination of the conflict between free
will and determinism, I suggest a different approach. I suggest that we may
learn more about desert by examining the implications of our basic com-
mitment to responsibility for choice. In this light I review the criminal law's
traditional approach to responsibility and preliminarily consider the various
challenges of modern character theory.
A. The Free Will Debate-Causes and Reasons
A complete understanding of free choice requires an understanding of
the connection between moral judgment and the natural, or physical, world.
7. That is, we might have acted in similar fashion if we were shaped by the same
environmental influences. See Part I.C. The "what I might have done" analogy is a common
one in moral discourse, and so may be useful as a persuasive tool, but it has a serious
conceptual limitation. Changes in a person's "situation" will generally change the person's
identity as well, undercutting the significance of the original comparison. To truly adopt
another's situation, for example, I would have to adopt his genetic heritage as well as his
environment, leaving almost nothing of "me." For a good sampling of modem philosophical
thought on personal identity, see THE IDENTrrrs OF PERSONS (A. Rorty ed. 1976).
8. In discussing desert, that hallmark of retribution, I do not always adhere to classical
retributive theory. In determining the noncontingent moral principles that should guide pun-
ishment, I do not limit myself to first-order principles of right and wrong. In keeping with
what I see as a pragmatic approach to criminal responsibility, I also look to the goods that
come from deserved punishment. To some extent this may be justified by a category distinction:
I admit the relevance of consequences in justifying the theory of punishment, not in its
practice. See Parts II and III.A. Nevertheless, strict retributivists may well object to this sort
of theoretical eclecticism, and indeed it requires extended justification. I hope to supply it in
a later paper.
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Free choice stands in the intellectual space between our status as creatures
of the natural world, subject to its physical laws, and as thinking persons
who make moral choices. In earlier times, the gap between these under-
standings was bridged by a belief in the normative structure of the natural
universe. Man lived in a kosmos ordered by the gods9 and principles of
right and wrong conduct could be derived from observation of the natural
universe. Thus in law, as in social life, humankind followed the perceived
command of God. In our pluralist and secular age, however, we cannot
ground the law in beliefs about a normative physical universe. The legal
separation of church and state explicitly prohibits the argument that law is
right because God said so.' 0 Perhaps even more important, the modern
triumph of science has dispelled the most appealing grounds for a belief
that the physical world has a normative order. The laws of human behavior,
like those of chemistry and physics, may be logical, but they say nothing
about right and wrong as we generally understand those concepts. Instead
of taking normative guidance from the world around us, we seem to be
losing our sense of the normative in the face of scientific understanding.
As a result, the first and perhaps hardest question for any modem theory
of deserved punishment is whether free choice is possible. The answer
involves the interrelationship of three fundamental concepts: reasons, cause,
and freedom. Almost all who believe in free choice do so on the ground
that persons have the ability to control their own actions according to their
rational powers. In other words, persons act according to reasons for which
they can be held responsible. Most who reject free choice, or express serious
doubts about it, do so on the ground that actions are caused by physical
processes. They argue that human actions can be traced to, and explained
in terms of, principles of genetics, environment, and probability. In this
sense, all human action is determined; it can be predicted given an under-
standing of the physical processes that apply in the particular situation. No
individual can break free of these causal forces and rationally create himself,
however much we might like to believe in that possibility. 1
9. On the need to move from an explanation of the universe as kosmos to one of nomos,
a human ordering of the world, see L. WEInrE_, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE (1987); Cover,
Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1983).
10. On the moral requirements of a secular, pluralist state, see Rawls, The Idea of an
Overlapping Consensus, 7 Oxrosw J.L. SrUDIus 4 (1987); Solum, Pluralism and Modernity,
66 Cm.[-]KErr L. REV. 93 (1991); Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 1083, 1087-
97 (1990).
11. See, e.g., J. HosPnRs, HumAN CONDUCT[:] AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF
ETnics 469-525 (1961); B.F. SKIaN, BEYOND FRnDOm AND DiONITY 5-25 (1971); B.F.
SKdnNR, SCIENCE AND HumAN BEHAVIOR 227-56 (1953) [hereinafter SCIENCE AND HUMAN
BEHAVIOR]. In criminal law the position was classically presented by Clarence Darrow. See C.
DARRow, Tan STORY OF My LIn 75-87, 338-49 (1932).
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Philosophers naturally tend toward the reasoned explanation of action;
scientists focus on causation.'2 The dispute between the two approaches
sometimes involves different conceptions of the physical universe. Some
behavioral scientists deny the reality of reasons, arguing they are but a
fiction of our consciousness, 3 while some philosophers argue that reasoned
action is not subject to the causal laws of the physical universe. 4 Increas-
ingly, however, scientists and philosophers concede the reality of both
reasoned and causal explanation. 5 The battle now rages over freedom, over
the moral significance of the fact that chosen action is also caused. The
question becomes: Can a person truly deserve punishment or reward if her
rationally chosen action can be traced to underlying circumstances over
which she had no control?
Most legal philosophers today take the compatibilist position that while
human choices are caused-and so are determined-free choice is not
precluded.' 6 Even if caused, choice can be rational and noncoerced, and
that is all that matters for responsibility. '7 They contend that determinism
is not only compatible with choice as the basis for responsibility, it also
12. By this I mean naturalistic causation: the laws of the physical universe as they affect
humans. This is most obvious in the work of behavioral scientists. See supra note 11. Many
criminologists take a similar approach. See, e.g., J. WILSON & R. HPU STEIN, CRIME &
HUAN NATURE 489-507 (1985). Some scientists, particularly those in the social sciences, take
a different approach, one that has been called interpretive. See A. ROSENBERG, PHILOSOPHY
OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 13-17 (1988). That is, such scientists do not seek to reduce human behavior
to its physical causes but rather seek to interpret human action; they try to render it intelligible
in human terms. They work within the common sense structure of desire-belief-action analysis
to deepen what we know from the ordinary experience of life. To put this another way,
interpretivist scientists work to illuminate and improve on what has been called folk psychology;
naturalistic scientists seek to replace folk psychology with an alternative way of understanding
human behavior. Since, as we will see, the interpretivist approach essentially parallels the
moralistic approach of law, it does not present the challenge of naturalistic science. For the
remainder of the essay when I refer to science, I mean naturalistic science.
13. See SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR, supra note 11, at 252-56.
14. For a full statement of the incompatibilist argument in philosophy, see P. VAN INWAGEN,
AN ESSAY ON FREE WILL (1983). Good introductions to the modern free will-determinism
debate can be found in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 436-99 (H. Morris ed. 1961) and FREE
WILL (G. Watson ed. 1982); see also FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM (B. Berofsky ed. 1966); M.
THORNTON, Do WE HAVE FREE WILL? (1989).
15. In the natural sciences, this trend is most evident in the burgeoning field of cognitive
science. See Horgan & Woodward, Folk Psychology Is Here to Stay, in MIND AND COGNITION
399 (W. Lycan ed. 1990). For the philosophic perspective, see infra note 16 and accompanying
text.
16. See Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAIn. L. REv. 1091 (1985); Morse,
Psychology, Determinism, and Legal Responsibility, in THE LAw AS A BEHAVORIAL INSTRUMENT:
NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION, 1985, at 35 (1986); see also D. DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM:
THE VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH WANTING 50-73 (1984); R. NOZICK, PIosOSPICAL
EXPLANATIONS 393-96 (1981).
17. For clear statements of this compatibilist position, see Moore, supra note 16; Morse,
supra note 16. See also R. NOzICK, supra note 16, at 393-97; 2 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF
Tan CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 101-04 (1883). For a somewhat- different argument to the
same effect, see Vuoso, Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 YALE L.J. 1661 (1987).
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may be a necessary precondition to choice.' 8 They argue that the choice
need be free only in the sense that the person acted rationally and without
coercion. 9
The modem compatibilist generally views the differences between philo-
sophic and scientific inquiries as a matter of perspective.20 We might imagine
a zoom lens that can be focused on events near or far along the cAusal
chain. The scientist, with his interest in causation according to genetics and
environment, adjusts the lens to telephoto length and looks beyond the
conscious reasons for a decision to its causal origins. By contrast, the
philosopher or lawyer adjusts the lens to the everyday perspective of human
experience, in which reasons for choice dominate the foreground while
genetic and environmental causes remain in the distant background.
The standard compatibilist view provides a persuasive account of how we
handle choice, but it does not support the special meaning of desert based
on choice. Generally when we say that a person deserves punishment we
mean that the consequence should attach because of the person's free choice
to do a wrong.2' We assume that the person could have done otherwise.22
The standard compatibilist view does not address this need for freedom.
Compatibilism explains how we can hold a rational actor like Dobbert
responsible-he rationally and without coercion chose to harm others-but
it does not say how, given his unchosen background, he could have done
otherwise.
18. See, e.g., Ayer, Freedom and Necessity, in FREE WYta, supra note 14, at 15. One of
the central objections to indeterminism is that the only plausible alternative to determinism is
chance-that actions cannot be predicted because they occur randomly. Yet random occurrences
provide no support for personal responsibility either. See Vuoso, supra note 17, at 1674-78.
19. As J.L. Austin put it: "Like 'real,' 'free' is used only to rule out the suggestion of
some or all of its recognized antitheses." Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in PHmIOSOPHY OF LAw
316, 318 (J. Feinberg & H. Gross eds. 1975). See also 2 J. STEPHEN, supra note 17, at 99-
110.
20. This stems from the fundamentally different perspectives of the disciplines. By training
and practice, scientists are committed to finding the deterministic causes of phenomena, while
lawyers concern themselves with human choice. Each ask fundamentally different questions.
In fact, the differences between the related disciplines of criminal law, psychology, criminology,
and sociology depend upon the different questions each seeks to answer. See, e.g., Cohen,
The Assumption that Crime Is a Product of Environments: Sociological Approaches, in
TimOaancAr_ METHODS IN CRnUNOLoGY 223, 229-32 (R. Meier ed. 1985).
21. See L. WEINREB, supra note 9, at 200-09. For discussions of the many senses of desert,
see J. FEINBERO, Justice and Personal Desert, in DoiNG AND DESERVING 55 (1970) and G.
SHER, DESERT (1987). For a critical view of retribution, and its notion of deserved punishment,
see Dolinko, Some Thoughts About Retributivism, 101 ETHICs 537 (1991).
22. See, e.g., H.L.A. HAT, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in PuNIs Nr AND RE-
SPONSmBrY 28, 30 (1968). The work of several philosophers, especially that of Harry Frankfurt,
has indicated that in some situations "could have done otherwise" does not capture the basic
moral intuition about chosen action that lies behind the criminal law. See H. Frankfurt,
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, 66 J. Pmi. 829 (1969); M. KLEIN, DETERII-
ISM, BLAMEWORTHNESS, AND DEPRrVA ON 30-48 (1990). See also infra notes 92-122 and
accompanying text.
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Perhaps, as legal philosopher Lloyd Weinreb suggests, there is no artic-
ulable, rational bridge between the natural and moral spheres. Perhaps
within the rational realm, freedom and cause are fundamentally and irrec-
oncilably opposed. 23 The metaphysics of free choice may present a problem
like that of "life" after death, which defies. rational discussion. Yet we
cannot simply leave the matter here. We must find a way of working with
our present state of rational understanding. We must decide whether an
offender like Dobbert deserves severe punishment.
Some philosophers have suggested that our understanding of problems
like free will depends essentially upon perspective, upon whether we adopt
a God-like view of the universe and its possibilities or contemplate the
world from the particular perspective of humanity.2A They argue that re-
taining the peculiarly human perspective-the world as it makes sense to
humans-can provide a critical grounding to philosophy. If it does not
supply ultimate answers, it may supply the answers we need. This is the
perspective I adopt for the remainder of the essay.
B. The Human Commitment to Choice
In his influential essay Freedom and Resentment,2 philosopher Peter
Strawson argues that both sides of the classically framed debate about free
will and determinism have asked the wrong question. Strawson maintains
that we should not worry about proving the existence of free will, because
this assumes the possibility of its negation. In fact, we cannot live without
it. He argues that our "reactive attitudes," the personalized, assessing
reactions that we have to others' actions and that play a critical role in our
moral judgments, are fundamental to human nature. He notes that these
reactive attitudes are so basic to our condition that they stand independent
of the truth or falsity of determinism or free will.M These attitudes are a
given, that "neither calls for, nor permits" rational justification.27 In other
words, our form of conscious, rational life commits us to a belief in free
choice.u
In fact, our commitment to responsibility for choice is fundamental. 29
Despite the metaphysical gulf, somehow we do reconcile freedom and cause
23. See L. WEINREB, supra note 9, at 263-65.
24. See, e.g., T. NAGEL, Tim Vrmw FROM NowHn~E (1986); R. SOLOMON, THE PA ssIONS
15-19 (1976).
25. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in FREE WYLt, supra note 14, at 59.
26. In other words, our reactive attitudes do not change according to what view of
determinism and free will we hold. Id. at 64-70.
27. Id. at 78.
28. See L. WHEIRaa, supra note 9, at 3-8.
29. See Weinreb, What Are Civil Rights?, 8 Soc. PML. & POL'Y 1, 3-8 (1991). Strawson
seems to make a related, but quite different, point in his essay. He suggests that our reactive
[Vol. 67:719
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and build the most important aspects of our lives on the concept of
responsible choice.3 0 If we take this commitment as our starting point, the
problem of criminal responsibility looks quite different. We now ask: What
does our commitment to choice involve? Does our commitment mandate
the traditional, chosen action view of responsibility, or does it support any
of the alternative character models?
C. The Chosen Action Model of Criminal Responsibility
American criminal law generally restricts its view of choice to the actor's
immediate decision to do wrong. As long as the individual rationally and
without coercion from an external source" chooses to do wrong, the actor
may be blamed and punished. Under this view persons who deliberately and
without justification or excuse seriously harm others deserve severe punish-
ment.32 The chosen action approach does not investigate the internal source
of the actor's decision to do wrong, nor does it explicitly analyze the
relationship between the offense and the individual's essential moral char-
acter. 33
The criminal law emphasizes rational mental processes. Its greatest concern
is with intentions-the actor's mental attitude toward the wrong involved
in his act. The law categorizes crime according to these attitudes-the
deliberation, purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence of the criminal
actor.34 The criminal law also requires that the actor be a rational chooser.
In assessing criminal liability, we ask if the actor perceives the world and
acts upon his perception in ways that the rest of us can readily accommodate
to our own world view. We ask whether the actor displays cognitive
rationality: Does he, for example, see that he is the individual described on
his driver's license and not the reincarnation of Jesus Christ? We ask
whether he works toward ends that we understand, such as the pursuit of
money, physical pleasure, or career advancement, as opposed to ends that
attitudes are fundamental and in fact constitute moral responsibility. That is, he seems to
argue that in considering morality all we can do is examine our own attitudes to determine
their efficacy in regulating behavior. There are no independent moral standards by which our
attitudes can be judged, because our attitudes are our morality. Strawson, Freedom and
Resentment, in FREE WiLL, supra note 14, at 80. For an illuminating exploration of this
theory, see Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme,
in REsPONSEBILITY, CHARACTER AND rm EMonoNs 256 (F. Schoeman ed. 1987).
30. L. WEnwaBB, supra note 9, at 263-65.
31. As classically represented in criminal law, the noncoercion requirement explains the
defenses of duress and necessity. The noncoercion requirement is often stated in terms of
ability to do otherwise. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 22, at 28, 30.
32. See Pillsbury, Evil and the Law of Murder, 24 U.C. DAvis L. Rnv. 437 (1990).
33. For arguments supporting this approach, see J. Danssa a, UNDERsTANDING CRNAL
LAw 701-02 (1987); H. GRoss, A THmoRY OF CRnMNAL JusnCE 321-28 (1979); Moore, Choice,
Character, and Excuse, in Cw , CULPa~an AND REmEDY 29, 31-40 (1990); Morse, The
Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 1247 (1976).
34. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1980).
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appear bizarre, such as preparing the planet for an invasion of space
mushrooms. We ask whether the means he has chosen to achieve his ends
make sense. Does he seek fame and fortune by such time-honored routes
as playing in a rock band or writing a self-help book, or does he expect to
achieve material success by constantly reciting prime numbers? We look
finally to volitional control: Is the individual sufficiently self-integrated that
his conscious mind maintains basic control over his actions?35
In some ways the criminal law tends toward a narrowly cognitive view
of rationality, one that emphasizes practical reasoning. Psychopaths, for
example, are held responsible for their chosen actions even though social
scientists have presented strong evidence that they feel no empathy for
others, an emotion probably essential to good moral character and moral
action. 36 Claims of excuse for brainwashing and organic brain damage are
normally treated as questions of immediate coercion and reasoning power
and not of general moral capacity.3 7
Those excuses that directly implicate moral responsibility-infancy and
insanity-suggest a broader perspective, however.3 8 In evaluating insanity
claims, most courts leave the definition of "knowledge" of right and wrong
open to broad jury interpretation.3 9 This suggests that moral agency involves
emotional as well as cognitive abilities. 4° The excuse of infancy also supports
a noncognitive component. Anglo-American law deems children under the
age of seven incapable of criminal choice, and those under the age of
35. See M. MooRE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 387-415 (1984). The criminal law's view of
rationality is a broad one; desires to harm others, while in some senses self-destructive, are
viewed as rational since they provide basic, readily comprehensible, satisfactions. See Pillsbury,
supra note 32.
36. See Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1381-83, denying reh'g and reh'g en banc and
amending 852 F.2d 1546 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1051 (1990); see also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.01(2) (1980).
37. Thus the defense in the most famous brainwashing case, that of Patty Hearst, argued
for an excuse under the rubric of duress. See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978). Organic brain damage claims are generally treated
under the rubrics of mental state, mental disease, or defect going to insanity, e.g., People v.
Babbitt, 45 Cal. 3d 660, 680-81, 755 P.2d 253, 265-66, 248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 82 (1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1034 (1989), or a factor in mitigation at sentencing, e.g., People v. Gallego,
52 Cal. 3d 115, 157, 802 P.2d 169, 185-86, 276 Cal. Rptr. 679, 695-96 (1990), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 337, reh'g denied, 112 S. Ct. 650 (1991); People v. Bonillas, 48 Cal. 3d 757, 780-
84, 771 P.2d 844, 856-59, 257 Cal. Rptr. 895, 908-10, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 922 (1989).
38. I am grateful to Peter Arenella for pointing out the link between these particular
excuses and moral agency.
39. See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANIT DEFENSE 49-51 (1967); W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT,
CRnMINAL LAW 313-14 (2d ed. 1986); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962) (making the requirement one of appreciation); H. FrNGARTrTE, THE MEANING OF
CRIMNAL INSANITY 137-42 (1972); P. Low, THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINcKLEY, JR.: A CASE
STUDY IN TIM INSANITY DEFEN E 47-64 (1986); Zilboorg, Misconceptions of Legal Insanity, 9
AM. J. ORTHOPsYCHmATRY 540, 552-53 (1939).
40. See H. FINGARETT, supra note 39, at 137-42; Zilboorg, supra note 39, at 552-53.
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fourteen are presumed to be nonresponsible,41 despite the fact that many
young people, including young children, are rational actors.42
The criminal law generally rejects excuses based on causal accounts of
criminality. For example, we know from personal experience and scientific
study that much of our basic temperament derives from-that is, is caused
by-genetic inheritance and so provides a classic instance of unchosen
influence upon action.43 If the bad-tempered person feels a much greater
temptation to violence in aggravating situations than do others, the differ-
ence stems from genetics, not free choice. Nevertheless, the ill-tempered
person cannot base a provocation claim on personality type, 44 nor can the
absent-minded claim exemption from reckless or negligent conduct. The
result is no different if the offender presents evidence that his basic dis-
position toward doing wrong resulted from unchosen environmental influ-
ences .4  We know that emotional and physical violence to a person as a
child can make that person a cruel and abusive adult, but criminal law
provides no excuse based on upbringing. Defendants with childhoods like
that of Ernest John Dobbert, Jr., and worse, compose most of those on
the nation's death rows.4 Likewise, although we know that the combination
of certain socioeconomic and racial statuses-all unchosen-create some
predisposition to criminality, we do not take them into account in deter-
minations of guilt or innocence. 47
41. In formal terms, the presumption of incapacity is irrebuttable for those under age 7
and rebuttable for those aged 7 to 14. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 39, at 398-
400; J. STEPHEN, supra note 17, at 97-99.
42. See Zilboorg, supra note 39, at 552-53.
43. For a general overview of genetic causes of crime, see J. WILSON & R. HE RRSmEN,
supra note 12, at 69-244.
44. See J. DRESSLER, supra note 33, at 480-81. While some have argued that provocation
provides a partial excuse to those whose tempers cause them to act violently where the
reasonable person would restrain violent impulses, e.g., Williams, Provocation and the Rea-
sonable Man, 1954 Cpum. L. Rav. 740, 750-51, others (more plausibly in my view) ground the
provocation doctrine in a sympathetic moral judgment of offender's motivation. See Von
Hirsch & Jareborg, Provocation and Culpability, in REsPoNsmLrry, CHARACTER AND THE
EMOTONS, supra note 29, at 241; see also Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense
in Search of a Rationale, 73 J. Cram. L. & CIRMNOLOoy 421 (1982).
45. That is, it does not change offense liability. Many consider it relevant to sentencing,
however. See infra note 47.
46. A particularly striking instance is that of Robert Alton Harris in California, whose
childhood saw abuse in all of its cruel variety and shaped a person capable of great cruelty.
See Harris v. Vasquez, 913 F.2d 606, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1990); Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d at
1381-83. For a fascinating discussion of the case, see Watson, supra note 29, at 267-86. For
a revealing look at one state's death row, see K. MILLER & B. MLLER, To KILL AND BE
KILLED: CASE STuDims FRoM FLo~mA's DEATH Row (1989).
47. Cf. United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 957-65 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting). Such factors may, however, be influential in some of the discretionary decisions
of criminal justice, such as plea bargaining and, in some instances, sentencing. For example,
in capital punishment decision making, where current law imposes few checks on mitigation
evidence, the defense presentation frequently consists of an extended character-based argument
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D. The Challenge-of-Character Theory
Recently a number of philosophers and legal theorists have revived an
approach suggested by David Hume that grants the importance of chosen
action but sees character as central to responsibility." These theorists argue
that only those chosen actions that reflect badly on the individual's essential
moral character should be punished. 49 The proposed definitions of essential
moral character differ substantially, however. At least three different strands
of character theory can be identified: (1) a causal model, (2) a representative
action model, and (3) a moral capacity model. As we will see, the moral
capacity approach presents the most significant challenge to the traditions
of criminal law.
1. The Causal Model
The causal approach seeks to distinguish those aspects of character caused
by unchosen influence and those that can fairly be attributed to the actor.
Under this view, wrongful actions that stem from those aspects of character
for mitigation. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978); Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 334-36 (1983); Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SuP. CT.
REv. 305, 329-33, 360-71 (1984). The move to determinate sentencing, however, has eliminated
or greatly reduced this possibility in many sentencing contexts. See, e.g., United States v.
Burch, 873 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1989).
Our common experience of morality reflects some of the same ambivalence about character
formation. If a mutual friend complains of the extreme jealousy another man exhibits toward
his wife, we might respond by saying, "That's Steve for you. He goes crazy whenever his
wife talks to another man. You have to understand what happened with his first wife. She
ran off with his best friend." Or we might say, "That's the way he was raised. In his family
the wife's not supposed to talk to other men." Usually, such comments are followed by the
caveat: "not that it's any excuse," suggesting that the explanation of character provides no
mitigation. This may be disingenuous, however. The plea for understanding is often seen as
a plea for mitigation. The speaker seems to imply that, at least for purposes of social
interaction, the subject should not be treated as harshly as if he had not experienced the
particular unchosen influence upon his character.
48. D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 455-70 (1739-40) (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.
1888). Hume was hardly the first to suggest a character-based view of morality, however.
Aristotle made character a foundation of his moral scheme. See AISTOTLE, THE NIcoMAcanAN
ETlucs (J. Thomson trans. 1953).
49. R. BRANDT, ETHIcAL THEoRY: THE PROBLEMS OF NORMATIVE AND CarrcAL ETcs 460-
78 (1959). Brandt views moral assessment as involving judgment of character traits, which he
describes as involving the "relatively enduring response-tendency of the whole person." Id. at
466 (emphasis in original); see also G. FLETCHER, RETHNKINO CRIMINAL LAW 799-807 (1978)(viewing criminal excuses as limited distortions of the actor's true character, such that we
cannot infer the nature of the actor's character from the act); N. LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT
65-68 (1988); Bayles, Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility, 1 LAw & PHIL. 5
(1982); Vuoso, supra note 17, at 1670-730; cf. Arenella, Character, Choice, and Moral Agency,
in CRnME, CULPABILITY AND RE EDY, supra note 33, at 59-61 (presenting a theory of moral
agency under the rubric of character theory).
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caused by other persons or by natural forces should be excused; wrongful
actions that stem from character traits attributable to the individual should
be punished.50 The approach builds on the common intuition that, while
persons are generally responsible for their own character, extraordinary
environmental or genetic influences may preclude such responsibility.-1
The causal model is in some ways the most appealing of the character
theories. It combines the reason-based judgment of traditional morality with
a causal understanding of human behavior. Psychologists who study human
patterns of attribution tend to use the causal approach as their theoretical
framework. 2 They contend that, in assessing others, persons distinguish
those aspects of the individual caused by external influence from those that
can be attributed to the individual.53 Arguments based on the causal approach
50. See Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 385 (1976);
Delgado, "'Rotten Social Background':" Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of
Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAw & INEQUALITY 9 (1985). For a similar approach
resting on utilitarian grounds, see Hill, Note, Freedom, Determinism, and the Externalization
of Responsibility in the Law: A Philosophical Analysis, 76 GEo. L.J. 2045, 2067-71 (1988).
Attribution theorists-those social scientists who study the links persons make between action
and consequence as a matter of psychology-take a similar approach. See infra notes 52-53.
51. Thus, a number of character theorists argue that blame for action stems from the
individual's responsibility for having the character trait behind the action. They argue that the
person is responsible for the trait either because she initially chose it, or, following the
Aristotelian view, is responsible for retaining the trait. E.g., G. FLETCHER, supra note 49, at
805-06 (although recognizing problems with responsibility for character); see AIuSTOTLE, supra
note 48, at 1103a-1106a; Audi, Responsible Action and Virtuous Character, 101 ETHics 309
(1991); cf. Arenella, supra note 49 (arguing for character responsibility based not on choice
but on the achievement of certain moral capacities). The scientific response to the argument
that persons are thus responsible for their characters is to push the analysis back one more
step. At some point, the initial "choice" on character must be traceable to genetics, environ-
ment, or chance. The decision on retaining character seems no more chosen, since it flows
from those second-order desires-desires about character-that themselves can be traced to
genetics or environment. For critical accounts of responsibility for character from the legal
and philosophic perspectives, see L. WEINREB, supra note 9, at 205-14; Dressler, Reflections
on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS
L.J. 671, 695-97 (1988); Watson, supra note 29, at 256. The concept of second-order desires
comes from the work of Harry Frankfurt. See Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept
of a Person, in FREE WILL, supra note 14, at 81-95.
52. For an introduction to attribution theory, see M. St.Aw & P. CosTANzo, THEORIEs or
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 232-58 (2d ed. 1982); ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND RESEARCH: CONCEPTUAL,
DEVELOPMENTAL AND SOCIAL DmIENSiONs 3-36 (1983) [hereinafter ATTRIBUTION THEORY AND
RESEARCH].
53. See F. HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 16-17, 79-124 (1958);
H. KELLEY, CAUSAL SCHEMATA AND THE ATTRIBUTION PROCESS 1-4 (1972). Both philosophers
and psychologists have criticized the standard approach of attribution theory for its failure to
recognize the variety of type and function of attributional decisions. See ATTRIBUnON THEORY
AND RESEARCH, supra note 52; Schoeman, Statistical Norms and Moral Attributions, in
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS, supra note 44, at 287. More seriously, some
psychologists confuse an accurate description of attribution patterns with a description of
morality. The relationship between common patterns of attribution and morality is highly
complex, involving the interplay between the science of behavior and moral expectations. See
infra Part III.C.
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commonly surface at sentencing in criminal cases and in everyday moral
conversation. Unfortunately, the causal approach does not survive careful
scrutiny; its essential argument, taken to its natural conclusion, eliminates
choice entirely.14
In law and modern social policy, the most popular application of the
causal theory involves excuse for socioeconomic background. Since we know
that racial discrimination, poverty, bad education, and a subculture of
criminality dispose some persons to crime, we might excuse those persons
for acting in accord with these unchosen influences. Yet, this argument,
which ties excuse to causation, has much broader implications.55 Logically,
all unchosen influences on action, including age, sex, intelligence, and even
geographic residence, should excuse.56 In fact, the argument has no stopping
place.
Proponents of the causal theory try to save responsibility for choice by
limiting their analysis of causation to certain aspects of character while
retaining traditional moral analysis for others. But the two approaches are
incompatible, at least as described. The scientific view of causation, from
which the causal model draws, holds that all action, including rational,
uncoerced, and reflective decisions, can be traced to the unchosen influence
of genetics, environment, or rules of probability. The scientific view holds
that if causation excuses, it excuses all human behavior-because all behavior
is caused. 57 While metaphysically arguable,' this causation-excuses-all po-
sition contradicts the human commitment to choice and responsibility that
provides the grounding for this Essay. For this reason, I will concentrate
on those character approaches that distinguish actions according to the
nature of the choices involved, rather than their causal history.
2. The Representative Action Model
Some commentators argue that chosen action should form the basis of
punishment only when it reflects the actor's enduring moral character.5 9
54. See Moore, supra note 16. Moore provides a thorough criticism of what he calls the
causal theory of the excuses, which provides the basis for much of the discussion here.
55. Some argue that the excuse rests not upon the individual's lack of responsibility for
self, but upon society's responsibility for the harmful influences on character. That is, since
society made the person bad, society's fault, its "unclean hands," precludes it from punishing.
See Bazelon, supra note 50, at 386-87; Delgado, supra note 50, at 13-15, 68-70, 77-78. This
argument lies beyond the scope of this Article, because it concerns society's right to punish
rather than the individual's ability to choose. See H. GROSS, supra note 33, at 319-23. As
should be clear from the discussions in Parts II and III, however, it takes a very different
view of punishment than I do here. For a criticism of the unclean hands approach, see
Dressier, supra note 44, at 686.
56. See J. WILSON & R. HERRNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 26-29, 104-72, 289-311 (reviewing
criminologic literature on causes of crime).
57. See Moore, supra note 16, at 1112-28; see also M. KLEIN, supra note 22, at 110-49.
58. See supra Part I.A.
59. We have to be careful here about a significant overlap between character approaches.
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Proponents of this approach, which I call the representative action model,
argue that criminal law generally punishes when wrongful action represents
the expression of a bad character trait.6° The theory rests on the idea that
in punishing we judge not only the action but also the person revealed by
the action. For example, when we declare that a purposeful killing is
manslaughter rather than murder, we make a judgment about the person
as well as the act. That is, we say that the offender did not reveal himself
to be the sort of evil-minded person we associate with the label "murderer."
The emphasis that proponents place on character in determining punish-
ment accords with many of our nonlegal blaming practices, but its shape
and usefulness depend on the defimition of character. We need to know
what counts as an enduring character trait in order to determine whether
chosen action reveals character or some other nonculpable aspect of the
actor's situation. Unfortunately, proponents have not yet presented a clear
definition of what counts as a character trait, thus leaving murky the
question of what counts as a moral choice.61 As a result, the theory's
significance seems limited to the most general understanding of criminal
punishment. I will return to it in the last section of the Essay, after
presenting my own theory of deserved punishment.62
3. The Moral Capacity Model
Finally, some character theorists argue for a closer examination of the
capacities necessary for moral decision making. 6 For example, Peter
In a general sense, all character theories rest on the notion that action must represent character
to qualify for punishment or reward. As I use the term here, the representative action approach
involves this notion where it does not rest on distinctions of capacity or causation.
60. E.g., Bayles, supra note 49, at 17; Vuoso, supra note 17, at 1670-73; see also G.
FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 799-807 (stating representative theory but using character theory
to support present legal structure); R. NozicK, supra note 16, at 393-96; Dressier, supra note
51, at 693-99. There may be instances when the traditional criminal law and the representative
action approaches diverge, however. See, e.g., Bayles, supra note 49, at 17.
61. George Vuoso, who presents one of the most sophisticated accounts of character theory,
recognizes the lack of precision in the character concept and notes that because of this even
a character-based approach will need to refer to other concepts or values in resolving hard
questions about whether a particular trait or disposition counts as part of essential characier
and so makes a-wrongdoer eligible for punishment. See Vuoso, supra note 17, at 1670 & n.31.
This raises the question of whether character theory as commonly presented is merely a
truism-true by definition, but unhelpful in making hard decisions. See Moore, supra note
33, at 44.
62. See infra Part III.A.
63. See Arenella, supra note 49. Arenela concentrates on questions of moral agency, not
legal responsibility. In this paper, I am interested in the confluence of the two. See also R.
DuFF, Tsuams AND PuNsmNarrs 262-66 (1986). Similar views of moral capacity, not connected
to character theory, have been espoused by other commentators in connection with mental
and emotional disorders. See M. BAVnGE, MAD OR BAD? (1989); H. FnGARE'Tr & A. HASSE,
MNtAL DiSAm=ins AND Ciuin.L RasPONsmrTY 218-39 (1979); H. Fn GaRmE, THE MEAN-
n-o oF CanNmAL ItsA=TY 179-94 (1972); Murphy, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psy-
chopathy, in RETRImUTION, JUsTICE, AND THERAPY 128 (1979).
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Arenella contends that moral responsibility requires certain moral-emotional
capacities beyond those mandated by chosen action.64 Although proponents
differ on their definition of moral capacity, all give a central place to the
ability to empathize.65 Without an ability to care for others, proponents
argue that a person cannot deserve punishment, even if her harmful act
was rational, intentional, and uncoerced. 6
The moral capacity model presents the most serious challenge to chosen
action. It avoids the pitfalls of the causal model in that it works within the
human perspective and seems consistent with our fundamental commitment
to choice. It also seems to enrich our view of choice.67 We know that good
character involves more than a working intellect. The person with good
character has empathy for others and can be self-critical. Since these qualities
are needed to be good and since we blame offenders for failing to attain
goodness, it seems to follow that these qualities are a prerequisite for
responsible choice.68 The model's inclusive perspective thus allows the crim-
inal law to recognize the complexity of moral concerns. It brings the law
closer to both the novelistic insights of the writer and the scientific insights
of the psychologist.6 9
The capacity model does present a practical problem, however. The denial
of responsibility can have dangerous consequences for those purportedly
excused. Society normally deals with the dangerous but nonresponsible by
subjecting them to forcible confinement and "treatment." Experience teaches
that this approach may be more destructive to individual worth than actual
punishment.70 While this consequentialist concern is serious, I will put it
aside here. My main concern is to determine, consistent with a commitment
to responsibility for choice, what conception of choice best supports deserved
punishment. In the next part of the Essay I offer an explanation and
64. See Arenella, supra note 49, at 82-83.
65. E.g., id. at 82; Murphy, supra note 63, at 130-31; see also R. DUFF, supra note 63,
at 263-64 (emphasizing capacity to understand punishment, a capacity the psychopath lacks
by his lack of empathy).
66. See Arenella, supra note 49, at 59-83.
67. See, e.g., id. at 59-61.
68. Id. at 82-83.
69. The position also has some support in current law in the excuse doctrines of insanity
and infancy. See supra Part I.C. At least in the context of insanity, an alternative explanation
is available, however. The breadth of the insanity defense might be explained by a broad view
of rationality that includes the emotions-a sense that persons can have crazy feelings as well
as crazy perceptions or ideas. See sources cited supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text for
more on the rationality of emotion. The example of infancy causes more problems for a pure
rationality model. See infra Part III.C.
70. See Morse, supra note 33, at 1255-57; Morris, Persons and Punishment, in ON GUILT
AND INNOCENCE 31 (1976); cf., Arenella, supra note 49. For a historical perspective, see Allen,
Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. Cnd. L. & CRnNoLoGY 226 (1959); Pillsbury,
Understanding Penal Reform: The Dynamic of Change, 80 J. Capm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726
(1989).
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practical justification for our commitment to responsibility for choice. This
provides a theory of responsibility which I use, in the final portion of the
Essay, to evaluate the moral capacity approach.
II. MORAL R.SPONSIBILITY AND THE ARGUMENT FROM MEANING
There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide.
Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the
fundamental question of philosophy.7'
So begins Albert Camus' classic investigation of humanity's existential
dilemma. Camus' concern with the worth of life brings us back to our
basic problem: the nature of our commitment to choice and moral respon-
sibility. Only when we understand that commitment can we decide what
deserved punishment involves. For present purposes, I assume that we can
answer Camus' question in the affirmative. Obviously, I cannot prove that
life has worth or meaning; most likely this is a question not susceptible to
logical or empirical proofs. Like most people, I live in the faith that life
has meaning and take that as my starting point. This perspective proves
enlightening; it reveals that moral responsibility provides one of our most
important ways of finding meaning in life.
A. The Argument from Meaning
The hoary phrase "the meaning of life" has been a figure of fun in
modern culture. 72 Even in modern philosophy, the question has received
scant attention. Most twentieth-century philosophers have treated meaning
as purely a question of language-an inquiry into what words signify.73 As
Robert Nozick has shown, however, investigating meaning in the larger
sense of ultimate-values-in-life remains a critical part of moral philosophy.74
Nozick argues that we find meaning in life by transcending the limits of
individual existence. Each of us transcends our small, isolated situations by
connecting ourselves and our actions to a wider context of value. The extent
to which we find meaning depends on the nature and extent of our
connections to larger value. A life devoted entirely to physical gratification-
a limited existence-provides less meaning than one that includes the rewards
of love and friendship-wider contexts of value.
71. A. CAmus, The Myth of Sisyphus, in THE MYTH OF SISY'HUS & OnMR ESSAYS 3 (J.
O'Brien trans. 1955).
72. For example, see Monty Python's The Meaning of Life (Celandine Films 1983).
73. See, e.g., A.J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LoGic 15-16 (1946); Grice, Utterer's
Meaning and Intentions, 78 PIL. Rnv. 147 (1969); Grice, Meaning, 66 PHIL. REv. 377 (1957).
74. See R. NozICK, THE ExAmn;ED LIFE (1989); R. NozICK, supra note 16, at 594-618.
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The argument from meaning, as I call it, makes a tentative connection
between the normative constructs of morality and the nonnormative laws
of the physical universe. In a pragmatic fashion-for what could be more
useful to the living of life than a conception of how it can be meaningful?-
the argument explains how moral values work in a "morally indifferent
universe." '75 It sheds new light on the nature of moral responsibility. If
morality involves an effort to find a certain kind of meaning in social life,
moral responsibility is the basic mechanism for its expression and construc-
tion. The argument from meaning suggests that moral responsibility is a
more creative, human-centered process than it is often considered. Such
responsibility involves the construction of a normative order based on
essential human experience rather than the deduction of moral triaths from
first principles.
The meaning approach should not be oversold. The argument from
meaning does not dictate the values critical to morality; it simply provides
a way of addressing issues of moral value. In the context of punishment,
meaning arguments may be made on behalf of all extant theories. Not all
will be equally strong, but all may be phrased in its terms. The signal
contribution of the meaning approach here is its answer to the question:
Where does desert come from?
The remainder of this Article tracks the meaning approach from its most
general statement to the particular concerns of criminal justice. In this
section I explore the way in which moral responsibility provides meaning
by connecting individual actions to moral values. In the last part of the
Essay, I consider how moral responsibility provides meaning in the context
of criminal justice.
B. The Basic Elements of Moral Responsibility
Moral responsibility may be understood as a mechanism to establish
moral order over time by attaching consequences to chosen actions. A
determination of moral responsibility involves four basic dimensions: the
normative goal-the moral order to be established; the temporal dimension-
the linkage of past action to present and future consequences; the range of
consequences that may attach to a determination of responsibility; and the
definition of free choice-the range of actions attributable to the actor. For
analytic purposes, these dimensions may be distinguished, but in operation
they are closely intertwined.
Two examples will illustrate the basic features of moral responsibility.
First, a friend who has had a great deal to drink at a party calls you-
quite without justification-a fascist pig. Second, a young boy is caught
75. L. WEINREB, supra note 9, at 265.
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stealing an expensive video game from a store. In each instance, if we hold
the individual responsible, we will do so according to an idea of moral
order. For example, we might say that, according to the norm of friendship,
friends should not insult each other. Likewise, the boy's theft violates a
basic principle of personal property. In each instance, depending upon our
evaluation of the other responsibility elements, we use responsibility to
impose human order on the world. We construct a nomos76 for the relevant
community.
Determinations of responsibility involve an important temporal dimension.
We must decide whether to link the past deeds of the boy and the friend
to present or future consequences. Responsibility forges links between past,
present, and future that otherwise would not exist. In this respect there are
critical variations in emphasis between responsibility modes. For example,
in punishment theory, the utilitarian approach emphasizes the present and
future effects of punishment. The utilitarian determining the boy's respon-
sibility may find most relevant the chance of his doing it again. The
retributive approach emphasizes the past deed and considers the present and
future consequences only as by-products of past action, not independent
considerations. The retributivist would concentrate on the nature of the
boy's offense, rather than his future behavior, in determining punishment.
77
Determinations of responsibility vary in important ways according to the
consequence that attaches to the finding. For example, we may decide that
the light-fingered boy should be held responsible but only for purposes of
parental reprimand and not criminal sanction. The range of consequences
is closely tied to that of normative order. A judgment according to the
norms of friendship implies application of friendship consequences; an
application of criminal consequences implies a judgment according to crim-
inal norms. Then questions of degree arise. If we believe that the friend's
action was culpable, we must decide whether it merits direct reproof,
snubbing, or ending the relationship.
Finally, and most importantly, each form of moral responsibility involves
a particular conception of choice. For moral responsibility to obtain, we
must determine that the boy and the friend chose in a fashion that makes
them responsible. We must decide whether the boy was old enough to
warrant punishment and whether the friend's intoxication amounts to an
excuse. The fact that all moral responsibility is based upon choice does not
determine how broad a definition of choice we use in any particular context,
76. See supra note 9.
77. Note that regardless of philosophy, punishment necessarily involves all three time
dimensions: past, present, and future. This suggests one reason why the debates between
utilitarians and retributivists are likely to go unresolved: both sides tend to emphasize one
time dimension without adequately considering the importance of other dimensions. For a
discussion of desert's relationship to the past, see G. SHER, supra note 21, at 175-93.
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however. Depending on the responsibility mode, we may define choice
narrowly and so restrict the range of responsible actions, or we may define
it broadly and enlarge the realm of responsibility. In this sense, the definition
of choice may depend on our view of responsibility and not the other way
around.
C. Responsibility and Emotion
An important mystery about responsibility remains: In a human sense,
how does it work? Separated into its component parts, responsibility seems
an abstract construct far removed from everyday experience. Yet, respon-
sibility suffuses our world, informing virtually every significant aspect of
our lives. How is it that this collection of principles applies with such force
in our lives? Or, to put the question differently: Why is responsibility
meaningful?
The animator of responsibility is human emotion. Emotion supplies the
current that brings responsibility to life within us. It provides the essential
connection between the individual's internal existence and the stimuli of the
outside world. 7 If an event matters to us, we react emotionally. This fact
of human life is so obvious, that we often forget it. Especially in a field
like criminal law, where dispassion is highly regarded, we may overlook the
ubiquity of emotional reaction. When we speak of judicial temperament
and the ability of a judge to avoid personalizing courtroom disputes, for
example, we do not ask the judge to become unfeeling. Rather, we say that
certain kinds of feelings should be avoided. And even as to these emotions,
we in essence urge that the judge find satisfaction-a variety of emotion-
in the role of dispassionate arbiter.79
Although we generally experience emotion without prior calculation,
emotional reactions nevertheless have their own kind of rationality. Con-
temporary theorists divide emotion into three essential elements: intellectual
assessment, reactive sensation, and desire for responsive action. 0 Anger,
for example, involves a judgment of blame, a sensation of violent arousal,
and a desire to inflict pain on the wrongdoer. If you become enraged by
your friend's insult, it is probably because you consider his words a violation
78. R. SOLOMON, supra note 24, at 12-15.
79. To give another example, scholarship is also considered a dispassionate endeavor. But
unless meant as a fundamental criticism-that is, it is passionless because it does not matter-
this observation represents a misunderstanding about emotion. The satisfactions and frustrations
of academic writing may lack the drama of compelling art, but they nevertheless represent
critical, and emotional, aspects of the experience.
80. See, e.g., R. DE SOUSA, Tim RATIONAL=TY OF EMOTIONS (1987); R. GORDON, Tim
SRucTnR OF EMOTIONS (1987); EXPLANno EMOTIONS (A. Rorty ed. 1980); R. SOLOMON, A
PASSION FOR JUSTICE 198-242 (1990); R. SOLOMON, supra note 24.
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of the principles of friendship. Even a strong "gut" reaction such as this
involves some assessment of action, some assessment of choice.
The rationality of emotion suggests that emotions play a complex role in
determinations of responsibility. Even our most reasoned judgments of
responsibility normally have an emotional basis. 81 We all have deeply
embedded value systems that are expressed by our emotional reactions and
that inform deliberative decision making. Yet emotions do not, by them-
selves, determine responsibility. 82 By definition, responsibility follows a
consistent normative order. Therefore, determinations of responsibility can-
not validate those emotional reactions that violate the applicable norms.
Our initial reaction to the friend's insult may be harsh; upset at his words,
we may reply in kind and make statements we later regret. In this instance
we would say that our emotions led us astray. Although our reaction felt
right, it was not.
We begin moral assessment with an emotional inclination, but this must
survive rational scrutiny to become the basis of moral judgment. If we see
some flaw in our emotional reaction, as we often do, we work to correct
it. If you recognize that your immediate reaction to your friend's insult is
more the product of your own bad mood than the wrongful act of your
friend, you try to restructure your reaction. You might try to hold your
tongue until you can respond in an appropriate fashion. Or if you have
already spoken, you might issue a partial apology. This process of emotional
evaluation and reconsideration does not always work, of course. Our efforts
may be hampered by self-deception or a lack of commitment to underlying
norms. The point is that emotional evaluation is an inescapable part of
moral assessment. Determining responsibility almost always involves working
from what feels good to what is good.
D. Responsibility and Value
Individual responsibility supports two fundamental bases of morality: the
continuing identity of the person and the individual's power of self-
determination. The identity component is easily overlooked because it rarely
causes a problem. Without realizing it, we identify and relate to each other
by the expressions we make, the words we use, and the deeds we do. We
use the concept of responsibility to link the past, present, and future actions
of the individual; responsibility allows us to consider her an integral, though
changing and complex, being. If we could not do this, if we could not
attribute actions to a person over time, our notion of identity would
81. See Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74
CoaRNL L. REv. 655 (1989).
82. Id.
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crumble.83 We would be like characters in a science fiction movie, wondering
what aliens inhabit the human bodies we confront.84
Moral responsibility involves more than attribution of deeds to particular
actors, however. We can, after all, attribute certain kinds of "actions" to
animals and machines and respond accordingly. We can cage dangerous
animals and repair defective machines. Moral responsibility, by adding the
imprimatur of praise or shame, recognizes a different kind of choice on the
part of the actor. Moral responsibility signifies our belief that human worth
comes from our choices. Because we can choose, because we can react to
stimulus and change, we have enormous potential. Responsibility tracks this
choice-making power by valuing the way in which we use it. Responsibility
tangibly values the source of human uniqueness, what philosophers call
autonomy. 5
By supporting autonomy, responsibility validates the emotional responses
necessary for meaning. We all want to be somebody, somebody special,
that is, and this requires responsibility for what we do. If an athlete were
not personally rewarded for her feats or a scholar for his writings, much
of the joy of those endeavors would be missing. Even the personal rewards
of accomplishment-the soul's sense of a job well done, which may come
without regard to the recognition of others-represents a kind of respon-
sibility. If we could not validate the experience of achievement, if we agreed
that one's work reflects nothing more than environment and genetic heritage,
a basic life satisfaction would disappear. Without the incentives provided
by responsibility, simply gathering the energy to get out of bed every day
would be an enormous challenge.
Moral responsibility, in at least some of its forms, supports a third value
as well-that of moral community. Moral responsibility supports a wide
range of affirmative obligations owed by members of society to each other.
Responsibility for purposes of friendship, for example, supports the value
of companionship and mutual support in the absence of romantic or family
involvement. While considerations of moral community potentially have
great influence on criminal law, I will concentrate my efforts here on the
value of autonomy as the basis of criminal responsibility. 6
83. This is why the identity question is a central one for any punishment theory, especially
a character-based one, that seeks to distinguish between actions on an identity basis. See
Dresser, Personal Identity and Punishment, 70 B.U.L. Rav. 395 (1990); see also G. SHER,
supra note 21, at 150-74.
84. See, e.g., Invasion of the Body Snatchers (Allied Artists 1956); Terminator 2: Judgment
Day (Carolco 1991).
85. See G. HEGEL, PHILosoPHY OF RIGHT 70-71 (T. Knox trans. 1952); Morris, supra note
70, at 46-57.
86. For an interesting treatment of community concerns in the criminal justice context, see
N. LAcEY, supra note 49; see also J. BRAiITwArrE & P. PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A
REPuBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMNAL JusTIcE (1990); R. ELLIS & C. ELLIs, THEORIES OF CRIMNAL
JusTIcE (1989).
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Moral responsibility enforces basic notions of right and wrong by pro-
viding concrete rewards for good conduct and punishments for bad. Without
consequences that attach to actions according to moral standards, we would
have little incentive to become better persons. Why should the insulter
behave better at parties when he can always blame his drinking? Why should
the boy respect property as long as he remains too young to be blamed?
Responsibility is our primary means of inspiring morality in each other. It
is our only way of forcefully telling each other about the moral status of
our actions.87 It helps us create order in a disordered world.
E. Denying Responsibility and the Requirement of Symmetry
The discussion of moral responsibility has so far focused on the value of
finding persons responsible for their actions. Yet moral responsibility also
involves instances of excusing individuals, and such excuses reflect value
determinations as well. 8 When we see the damage wreaked by a natural
disaster-a flood or earthquake, for example-we recognize an event beyond
human influence, for which no person should be held responsible. 9 Certain
human "actions," such as an unwarned epileptic seizure, fall into the same
category. We say in these instances that there was nothing anyone could
have or should have done differently.
In the short term, denying responsibility enhances personal freedom. Such
denials mean we can live in a nearly unlimited present, free to remake
ourselves with every new day. Denying responsibility is most attractive, of
course, when a determination of responsibility would entail painful conse-
quences for ourselves or those we care about. For the friendly insulter,
denying responsibility means awaking the next day with an aching head but
a clear conscience. He may tell himself: There's no need to apologize
because everyone was drinking, and by now, it's ancient history anyway.
Denying responsibility permits a new start to life, with all the wonderful
possibilities that implies. It emphasizes the person that the individual might
become rather than the one he has been.
87. Although my main concern is with responsibility as an external event, one in which a
person is found to be responsible by another, the internal experience of morality also involves
responsibility. If the boy came to understand the wrong of stealing and resolved in some way
to make amends, he would be holding himself responsible. In this way we see the impossibility
of morality without responsibility.
88. I should make clear that my focus is upon denying rather than shifting individual
responsibility. Often, when we speak of denying responsibility, we really mean that we should
shift primary responsibility between individual actors. For example, we might decide that the
young thief should not be punished because he was forced to steal by his older brother. This
kind of responsibility shifting does not concern us here because our immediate concern is
determining whether to hold any individual responsible.
89. Although, of course, we assign responsibility for failing to prepare for such events.
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Whatever approach to responsibility we take, we must be consistent,
however. If responsibility is to be principled, we need norms that produce
determinations without regard to selfish concerns. We often fail this stan-
dard. Too often we tip the judgment scales in our favor for our own actions
and tip them the other way for strangers or enemies. We are quicker to
praise ourselves for good results than we are to accept blame for bad ones.9°
We must constantly remind ourselves that such self-interested, unprincipled
methods cannot support moral responsibility. Certainly the notion of desert,
as generally understood, does not permit such asymmetry.
The symmetrical approach to responsibility requires absolute consistency
in attribution between blame and reward. If the insulter seeks to renew his
friendship with you by inviting you to lunch, yet sees no need for apology,
he acts from contradictory beliefs. Why should he gain the positive conse-
quences of one act-the lunch invitation-yet not suffer the negative con-
sequences of another-the insult? His only philosophic hope is to provide
a theory that shows that exceptional reasons excuse the insult while the
general rule of responsibility governs the invitation.
Widespread denials of responsibility sever the link between human action
and value. They create a sense of disorder by declaring that human actions
occur arbitrarily-at least in a moral sense. Those who contend that deter-
minism precludes deserved punishments or rewards have a plausible meta-
physical argument for this position, but as we have seen, the argument
contradicts the human commitment to responsibility. That commitment
requires us to find a principled stopping place for both excuse and respon-
sibility.
III. DESERVED PUNISHMENT RECONSIDERED
Armed with new insights into meaning and responsibility, we now return
to the definition of deserved punishment. In the final part of this Essay, I
offer the outlines of a theory of punishment grounded in the argument
from meaning. I argue that, as part of our larger effort to find moral
meaning in life, punishment involves a defense of value, particularly the
value of autonomy. This approach finally allows us to resolve how an
offender like Dobbert, Jr. may deserve serious punishment.
90. Attribution research indicates, unsurprisingly, that in explaining their own actions
individuals tend to attribute actions that produce bad results to adverse situations and actions
that produce good results to positive personal qualities. See E. HOLLANDER, PRINCIPLES AND
METHODS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 115 (4th ed. 1981). Another asymmetrical tendency in our
attribution practices, called the fundamental attribution error, is the tendency of observers to
explain others' actions by reference to intentions and individuals' tendency to explain their
own actions by situation. See E. JoNEs & R. NISBET, THE ACTOR AND THE OBSERVED: DIVERGENT
PERCEPTIONS OF THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR (1971).
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A. The Meaning of Deserved Punishment
In the modern American context, there is something odd about considering
criminal justice in terms of the meaning of life. We normally think of
meaning questions as intensely personal. Whether I find meaning in making
money or in helping others, in teaching law or in writing novels, these are
matters of personal choice. Our liberal, democratic, and pluralist approach
to social life seems to rule out the application of criminal sanctions-the
state's most forceful intervention into private life-based on meaning con-
siderations. Yet serious criminal offenses represent such broad-based attacks
on our normal conception of meaning that we must, and do, consider
meaning in punishment.
In committing a serious offense, the criminal necessarily challenges the
possibility of moral meaning. Crimes such as murder, rape, and robbery
involve intentional decisions to pursue personal satisfaction at the cost of
others' autonomy. The offender deliberately disrespects others' lives, bodies,
or property for nonmoral, sometimes immoral, reasons. The intentionality
of the act gives crime its special horror, and punishment its special impor-
tance.
Persons who challenge moral meaning do so in two basic ways: by a
deliberate attack on human value or by action that displays indifference to
human value. Offenders may thus be either consciously immoral or morally
indifferent. The former act out of a conscious desire to flout moral principle
and aggressively seek another's injury as an end in itself; the latter pursue
selfish ends without any regard for the value of others.9' Both kinds of
offenders challenge moral meaning because their disregard for human au-
tonomy represents a radically reductionist stance on meaning in social life.92
Directly or indirectly, the actions of these offenders argue that meaning
comes only through satisfaction of selfish, nonmoral wants. At their most
extreme, serious criminal offenses express the Nietzschean philosophy of
the superman, whose will to gain power overrides all who might stand in
his way.93 Even in our pluralist, secular society, we can agree that such
radical selfishness is evil. Even if we cannot agree on a single conception
of good, we can agree on a minimal conception of evil in social conduct.
This suggests another way of understanding punishment: as a defense of
value. When we say that a murderer deserves serious punishment for his
action, we morally connect his action and our response to the value of
autonomy. We defend our own vision of moral meaning by linking the
91. For an illuminating account of the varieties of immorality, see R. Mao, IMMoRxrry
(1984). See also Pillsbury, supra note 32, at 1445-46.
92. See R. Nozick, supra note 16, at 630.
93. See F. Nm'rzscHa, BEYOND GOOD AND EvIL 21 (W. Kaufmann trans. 1966); Pillsbury,
supra note 32, at 470-74.
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wrong of his choice to kill with the consequence of punishment.9 We
deliberately shape our emotional reaction to the offense into a proportionate,
morally based reaction. 95 In this sense "crime and punishment" represents
a moral dialogue, but one waged with action as well as words, in fact, one
in which action counts for more than words. In committing a serious crime,
the offender argues for nonmoral or immoral meaning;6 in punishing, the
state insists upon moral meaning based on the value of autonomy.. The act
of punishment defends the victim's right to autonomy by penalizing its
unjustified violation, yet it respects the offender's autonomy by taking his
criminal decision seriously. 97
B. The Basics of Criminal Responsibility
Under the defense-of-value approach, punishment is deserved according
to the offender's choice to challenge moral meaning. For this reason, we
are preoccupied with an offender's mental state in judging the extent to
which her action demeans the value of autonomy. To determine just
punishment we must assess the offender's awareness of and attitude toward
the harm done. 9 We look for evidence of coercion, for coerced actors do
not challenge moral meaning. Their deeds, even if wrongful, represent the
choices of others. This approach also requires basic rationality. A nonra-
tional person does not, by her harmful actions, effectively challenge our
basic values. We can understand the usual criminal motivations-the urges
to violence and other forms of moral disregard resonate in basic human
94. R. Nozicx, supra note 16, at 375-90. This approach bears a close resemblance to
theories that emphasize the educative function of punishment, see E. DuRKHEIM, MoaLi
EDUCATION (E. Wilson ed. 1961); Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13
PIL. & PUB. AEFAmS 208 (1984); the condemnation function of punishment, e.g., Hart,
Criminal Punishment as Public Condemnation, in CoNTMOaRARY PUNIsHMnENT 12 (1972); and
punishment as behavior interpretation, e.g., Sendor, Crime as Communication: An Interpretive
Theory of the Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74 GEo. L.J. 1371 (1986).
For a critical view, see N. WALKER, PUNIsHMENT, DANGER AND STiGmA 28-45 (1980).
95. Nozick speaks of the criminal "flouting" moral values. R. NozIcK, supra note 16, at
390-97. Jean Hampton makes a similar argument, describing criminal intentionality as a kind
of defiance. Hampton, Mens Rea, in CRIME, CuLPABiLrY AND REMEDY, supra note 33, at 1.
96. For an approach that similarly sees punishment as part of a dialogue, see R. DUFF,
supra note 63, at 39-73, 235-66. My approach differs from Duff's, in part, because he follows
the moral capacity model of moral responsibility, arguing that the offender must be capable,
in emotional as well as rational terms, of understanding the moral message of punishment.
Id. at 262-66. As Duff puts it, the offender "must already have some concern, which
punishment may reawaken and strengthen, for the values she has flouted; or at least that she
has some moral concerns that would enable her to come, through her punishment, to understand
and care for the values that the law embodies." Id. at 263-64. For my account of moral
agency, see infra Part III.C.
97. See G. HEGEL, supra note 85, at 70-71; Morris, supra note 70, at 46-49.
98. Analysis of motive is often relevant here, although it is often not recognized by the
criminal law. See Pillsbury, supra note 32.
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nature-but how can anyone find satisfaction in basic delusion? Even if
dangerous, crazy wrongdoers do not engage us in a dialogue about moral
meaning. In a fundamental sense, their actions seem meaningless.
The hard question is whether criminal responsibility requires more than
mental state, rationality, and noncoercion. Must we also find that the
wrongful action reflects something basic about the actor's character, 99 that
the offender possessed a "moral capacity" to appreciate the values that his
actions implicate?1"' Although I disagree with the character theory proposals,
I agree that responsibility requires something more than rationality, inten-
tionality, and noncoercion. The offender must also have had enough ex-
perience of life as a feeling, rational chooser in order for us to understand
his action as implicating meaning. We need to see that the person has had
enough experience of life to take a stance on basic human value.
In order to judge a person criminally responsible, she must have a basic
conception of human value. She may not agree with our conception, and
indeed she may reject the idea that humans have any special value. We
look to see, however, if she knows enough of life to take a position on the
question. The excuse granted for youth may provide the clearest example.
Although rational, children are not criminally responsible because they have
not experienced enough suffering from others' actions and have not wit-
nessed enough instances of others' suffering at their own hands for us to
presume basic comprehension of human pain. Our blaming practices suggest
that although young children may have some cartoonish notion of the
connection between act and consequence we believe they lack the experience
to comprehend its significance in terms of meaning. Similarly, we can
imagine other rational and uncoerced actors, such as the brainwashed or
brain damaged, who do not seem responsible because of their lack of
choosing experience following their traumatic event.
The experience requirement presumes that the individual feels emotion.
As we have seen, emotions play a critical role in finding meaning in life. 10
We work from our emotional reactions to develop the values that make up
a moral philosophy. Here we must distinguish, though, between the emotions
needed to build a moral philosophy and those needed to be a morally
sensitive person. In order to take a position on human value, the actor
need only experience personal pleasure and pain. He need not have any
feelings for others. The utterly selfish person has a philosophy about human
value: only he counts. We may disagree with this philosophy-indeed we
may punish the person when it leads him to harm others-but it does
constitute a philosophy. The selfish person takes a stand on what makes
life meaningful.
99. See supra Part I.D.2.
100. See supra Part I.D.3.
101. See supra Part II.C.
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An example from popular culture illustrates the point in bright colors.
In the movie Terminator 2, l2 a boy becomes the focus of a deadly struggle
between two killer robots, terminators, which have been sent back from the
future. As a classic example of the human-meets-alien/robot genre, the
movie concerns, in part, the humanization of the robot, in this case the
"good" terminator played by Arnold Schwarzenegger. Early on, when the
boy protests the robot's willingness to kill, Schwarzenegger blithely explains:
"I'm a terminator." When told that he cannot kill, the robot expresses
complete bewilderment. At this point the robot displays rationality but lacks
the experience of choosing and feeling necessary for moral agency. By the
end of the movie, Schwarzenegger is transformed. By virtue of his own
experiences and those of the persons around him, he comes to recognize,
and also appreciate, human value.
Hollywood spectaculars notwithstanding, the experience requirement will
only rarely make a difference in criminal adjudication. Some instances of
brainwashing or organic brain damage might represent claims under the
requirement. Where an unchosen event so alters the choosing consciousness
as to render the individual a different person, 03 harmful actions by the
person appear in a different moral light. The "new" person appears childlike
in that she has not had a sufficient opportunity to experience life as a
rational, feeling chooser. This approach puts a time limit on the excuse,
however. If over a period of time the "new" person suffers from others'
actions and sees others suffer from her own actions, assuming continuing
rationality, the person again becomes responsible.
The experience requirement would not excuse most psychopaths, those
who by virtue of genetics or environment lack empathy for others. 4 Such
persons are rational actors; they experience pain at the hands of others,
and they can see the pain they cause others. They are engaged in finding
meaning in a readily comprehensible and morally challenging way. The
pleasures such persons take in deception, manipulation, and a host of other
selfish strategies may seem self-defeating in the long run, but this does not
make them irrational. The same might be said of the unstinting pursuit of
money and power that characterizes so many of our leading citizens. Only
if a psychopath lacks selfish feelings should he be excused. If the person
has no experience of emotion, if she reacts to generally harmful or pleas-
102. See supra note 84.
103. Defining what this is represents a task beyond the scope of my efforts here.
104. For a general introduction to the scientific literature, see H. CrcKLY, THE MASK OF
SANrry (1941); R. HARE, PsYCHOPATHY: THEORY AND RESEARCH (1970). For a highly critical
view of the concept of psychopathy, see Hakeem, The Assumption That Crime Is a Product
of Individual Characteristics: A Prime Example from Psychiatry, in TnmoRancAL METHODS
IN CamIqoLoOy, supra note 20, at 197.
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urable events with robot-like indifference, she cannot challenge our moral
scheme and should not be held criminally responsible.105
C. The Defense of Value and Punishing for Bad Character
The defense-of-value approach to deserved punishment differs in impor-
tant respects from that of both the representative action and the moral
capacity models. In both instances the distinctions revolve around the
understanding of desert itself. The representative action model draws from
the common idea'06 that desert signifies an all-encompassing examination of
the person. Punishment, therefore, must examine character as well as deed. 107
By contrast, defense of value emphasizes the moral principles implicated by
the offender's intentional choice. The character source of that choice is
important only to the extent it affects the actor's intentionality and status
as a moral agent. Punishment as defense of value focuses on the wrongdoer
because only persons can challenge moral meaning. The value approach
insists on the worth of offenders as well as victims, and so, from this
perspective, the tendency of representative action to blame based on char-
acter appears unjustified and morally dangerous. It looks like a rejection
of worth rather than an assessment of moral action.
In at least one respect, however, the defense-of-value approach may
coincide with representative action analysis. The defense of value, like most
theories of punishment, requires a basic identity between the individual who
committed the wrong and the one to be punished. This requirement of
identity is usually satisfied by a presumption of identity from continuous
physical existence.108 Certain kinds of radical personality changes within the
same physical person may rebut this presumption, however.""9 The require-
ment that wrongdoing reflect an enduring character trait may provide
important clues to these complex problems of personal identity. There may
105. Such offenders will be rare, if they exist at all. It is hard to imagine a person without
any self-concern undertaking significant interaction with others. I should add that the emotion
requirement here goes to something more fundamental than simple self-esteem. While most
offenders have low opinions of themselves and do not care for themselves in psychologically
healthy ways, this does not preclude their taking a position on matters of human value. Indeed,
it leads them to disvalue human life and autonomy.
106. The idea is common in punishment arguments used in the practice of law and by the
public.
107. See generally supra Part I.D. Looking beyond the offender's intentional choice to see
if action reflects something essential about the actor's moral character suggests a firmer and
broader basis for blame. E.g., Bayles, supra note 49, at 8-12; G. FRETCDER, supra note 49,
at 799-806.
108. See Dresser, supra note 83, at 405-06.
109. Identity questions of this kind arise when the chooser of the action seems, in a moral
sense, to be fundamentally different from the agent subject to punishment, despite physical
identity. Such questions usually involve mental disorders such as multiple personalities or the
sane offender who becomes insane after legal proceedings begin.
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be such a discontinuity between the character of the person who committed
the crime and that of the person to be punished as to preclude a dialogue
of crime and punishment. In this limited sense, the requirement that action
represent essential character accords with the defense-of-value approach." 0
D. Defense of Value and the Moral Capacity Model
Moral capacity proponents also take a quite different view of deserved
punishment than I have proposed here. They contend that punishment is
not deserved unless the offender had the ability to do otherwise, including
the ability to feel otherwise. Capacity proponents argue, in essence, that we
should excuse those persons who have not previously shown feeling for
others, because such persons have no capacity for moral concern, and if
they lack capacity for moral concern, they also lack capacity for moral
action."' The significant appeal of this approach is that it seems to track
our basic conception of free choice-that is, ability to do otherwise-and
applies it in common sense fashion. However, the approach stands in
considerable tension with our commitment to responsibility for choice.
Initially, the most significant problem with moral capacity appears to be
empirical: How do we determine capacity? Generally speaking, the best way
to tell what a person can do is to look at what he has done. Yet the notion
of capacity goes beyond proven ability. It includes the idea of moral
potential-the possibility that a person could do better than he has. We
must resist the conclusion that a person who never has done better, also
could not do better. Otherwise, we lose the essence of morality. This insight
leads us closer to the central problem with the capacity approach: its
inclusion of moral motivation within the requirement of ability to do
otherwise.
Consider three categories of potential moral agents. The first group-we
may call them the selfish-are persons who have never shown concern for
anyone but themselves. The second group-limited empathizers-have dem-
onstrated concern for one or two other persons in their lives. The third
group is comprised of full empathizers-those who have demonstrated
concern for many persons in their lives. For each of these groups, the
capacity question is: In any given instance of demonstrated lack of moral
concern, did the person have the capacity to feel, and thus do, otherwise?
Our experience of life allows us to make predictions about what persons
in each category will do, but this does not resolve the question of what
110. As noted before, this will require a great deal more conceptual work and precision
than have been done to date. See supra note 61.
111. See, e.g., H. FINGARTTE & A. HASSE, supra note 63, at 218-39; see also M. BAVIDGE,
supra note 63, at 92-93, 132-37 (Psychopaths are not autonomous and so not morally
responsible.); Murphy, supra note 63, at 134 (Psychopaths cannot claim rights, including rights
to punishment, because they feel no obligations to others.).
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they could do." 2 In fact, we have virtually no information about capacity,
except reports of past action."' Even comparisons between categories of
persons seem problematic. We have no good way of telling whether a selfish
person had more or less capacity to care for another than would a limited
empathizer who confronted one outside of his inner circle of persons to be
cared for. And how do these situations compare with that of a full
empathizer confronted by a long-time enemy?
Let us assume for the moment that we can answer these empirical
questions. Assume that, even if not provable, we can devise satisfactory
moral standards for moral capacity. We now see the essential problem, that
the moral capacity approach contradicts our fundamental commitment to
responsibility for choice. To understand the contradiction we must return
to the question of what kind of choice supports responsibility.
The moral capacity approach rests on the traditional requirement of free
choice, of choice as ability to do otherwise. As we have seen,114 determinism
creates serious problems with this understanding of responsible choice. We
cannot say, with any degree of assurance, that an offender like Dobbert,
Jr. could have done otherwise under the circumstances he faced. His genetic
and environmentally inspired disposition to child abuse may have precluded
any different choice. All we can say is that, given proper motivation,
Dobbert, Jr. could have chosen differently. To put the problem another
way, we generally accept that persons can exercise control over what they
do, and, to a lesser extent, what they want. If we wish to change our
dispositions, we have some ability to do so. We have little or no control,
however, over what have been called second-order desires-our desires about
desires." 5 We have little or no control over the sort of person we want to
be. Yet the moral capacity approach, by excusing for lack of moral
motivation, centers responsibility on just this aspect of character. The
capacity model mandates that the person must have the ability to want to
do good. A brief look at some of our accepted blaming practices illustrates
the problems with this approach.
When we describe wrongdoers as cold, sadistic, or cruel, we do not signify
any excuse for their lack of moral concern; we blame them for it. Counselors
112. Another way of putting this is that we must distinguish between what people win do
in a particular situation and what we expect they should do. The famous Milgram experiment
established that many people will inflict great suffering on others if given authoritative
instructions to do so. See S. MLoRAM, OBEDMENCE TO AuTxolrrY (1974). In a moral sense,
the fact of instruction does not provide an excuse, however.
113. On the difficulties of determining capacity in a somewhat different context, that of
mental state, see Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRnM. L. &
CR oLoGY 1, 42-44 (1984).
114. See supra Part I.A.
115. See Frankfurt, Freedom of Will and the Concept of a Person, in FREE WL, supra
note 14, at 81-86.
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who work with rapists report that many are "numbed out," that they have
experienced so much horror and pain in their own lives that they are
desensitized to it in the lives of others." 6 This explains their behavior and
gives us a new basis for appreciating them as persons. We can sympathize
for the way in which they have been devalued. As a matter of criminal
justice, however, this account cannot provide an excuse. Regardless of how
he came to be an uncaring, violent person, we blame the rapist for his
uncaring, violent act."7
Similarly, when we tell someone that we think they could have done
better, what we really mean is that if the person cared more, if she tried
harder, she would have done better. If the student had studied harder, she
would have written a better exam. If the driver had paid more attention,
he would have avoided the accident. In all instances we judge the motivation
itself.
E. The Dobbert Case Revisited
We should end with a look at the case that started this inquiry, that of
Ernest John Dobbert, Jr., the father convicted of terrible crimes against his
children. In his repeated, brutal assaults on his children, Dobbert, Jr. valued
his own worth and emotional self-satisfaction over that of his sons and
daughters. He vented his rage on their bodies and souls. His intentional
actions declared that he was their ruler, that they would have no separate
existence from his and, in two instances, no existence at all. Dobbert's
murderous abuse spoke of a world without moral meaning, where autonomy
held no special value. The State of Florida punished Ernest John Dobbert,
Jr. to defend moral meaning against his violent challenge. The state, acting
for society generally, sought to defend the possibility of moral meaning
based on autonomy.
This account of punishment seems correct, and yet incomplete.", It still
seems vulnerable to the objection of the psychologist-skeptic who argues
116. The Mind of the Rapist, NEWSWEEK, July 23, 1990, at 46, 50-52. In keeping with our
general blaming practices, the professional counselor described one rapist who witnessed a
brutal assault on his mother by his father, observing: "That's not an excuse, but it does
explain his desensitization to violence." Id. at 52.
117. This serves as another reminder of the complexity of moral concern and the limited
nature of criminal responsibility. For purposes of criminal liability we do not and, I argue,
should not consider formative influence; for many other purposes we do and should.
118. Some may object that this account of punishment accords with neither of the classical
theories of punishment. The retributivist will complain because the theory gives weight to a
consequentialist concern: the impact on future actors of Dobbert's punishment. The utilitarian
will object because this concern is not paramount; punishment depends not on direct deterrence
of Dobbert, Jr. and others, but upon a metaphysical defense of value. In other words, behind
language that sounds forward thinking, the past deed of the actor seems to define the
punishment, as in retribution. Yet surely the difficulty of philosophic categorization should
not, by itself, defeat the approach. The true objection comes from the alternative force of
opposing theories, objections which if I have not answered so far I must leave to others to
develop.
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that this picture of fault is radically foreshortened, excluding the full
dimension of human tragedy. So much of what we know about why
Dobbert, Jr. attacked his children is ignored. As a matter of individual
moral responsibility, this argument does not concern me. The argument
from meaning supports a broad view of free choice that excludes most
causal excuses and capacity excuses. Yet determinations of individual cul-
pability do not exhaust our concern with moral responsibility. Society has
its own responsibilities to consider.
The Dobbert case had a major impact on the city in which it occurred.
Before the case broke, most people in Jacksonville knew little about child
abuse. During the critical period of abuse, neighbors repeatedly called police
about their concerns for the Dobbert children, but investigating officers,
ignorant of abuse, always accepted Dobbert's explanations and assurances.
The case educated local authorities and the rest of the populace." 9 Public
outcry about the cases led to the creation of a state hotline for the reporting
of child abuse.120 From the time of its inception, Jacksonville had the highest
rate of child abuse reporting in the state, a fact that some attributed to
awareness of the problem generated by the Dobbert case.'2'
From this small example we see the possibilities of a different mode of
responsibility, one that involves obligations owed by society generally to its
individual members. If environment contributes to crime-and it surely
does-and society determines environment, at least in part, society bears
some responsibility for crime. This does not change individual responsibility
for criminal purposes, but neither does punishment end all responsibility
inquiry. In determining those obligations that each of us owe our fellow
citizens, we should consider responsibility for fostering good character. The
values of autonomy'2 and moral community should create general obliga-
tions to minimize harmful influences on character formation. Here our
normative order is the just society; the choice involved is the set of actions
and inactions of society members that provoke and perpetuate conditions
such as racism, poverty, and lack of opportunity. The temporal focus must
be broad, including a recognition of the long history of such conditions
and the importance of change for a better future. The consequences of a
119. Assisting in the education process was a lawsuit filed on behalf of the surviving Dobbert
children against the City of Jacksonville for the negligence of the police in investigating reports
of their abuse. Florida First Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville v. City of Jacksonville, 310 So. 2d
19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert. dismissed, 339 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1976). The case was settled
during the course of trial for nearly a million dollars.
120. Florida Is Half-Hearted in Fighting Child Abuse, Florida Times Union, June 4, 1981,
at A14.
121. Child Abuse Cases Spotlight Problems, Florida Times Union-Jacksonville Journal, Feb.
19, 1978, at B1.
122. That is, maximizing the total autonomy enjoyed by law-abiding citizens. I am not sure
that encouraging good character rather than bad actually changes the degree of autonomy
experienced by the would-be offender.
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determination of responsibility in this context are the commitment of social
resources, that is, energy and money. Such collective responsibility is entirely
consistent with present approaches to criminal punishment; it simply rep-
resents a different mode of responsibility. While we hold offenders respon-
sible for who they are and what they do, we must do the same for ourselves.
That means that the project of self-improvement requires a social as well
as an individual effort.
CONCLUSION
For several years I used the last session of my criminal justice class for
a discussion of the death penalty and the Dobbert case. It seemed to bring
together the essential themes of the course. I assigned background reading
on the case and in class gave an oral account of the prosecution and defense
perspectives. The raw power of the story and the conflicting emotions it
evokes made the discussion difficult but worthwhile. Only at the end of
class did I mention how the case ended: In the fall of 1983, the State of
Florida killed Ernest John Dobbert, Jr. in its electric chair.
Usually when I gave the story's ending, the class was quiet for a moment
and I went on with my closing words for the course. I liked to think that
the students shared my sadness at the execution and perhaps a little of my
revulsion for that form of punishment. I remembered the strange, disquieting
feeling I had when I first heard of the execution. But the last time I used
the case, the class burst into applause at the news of Dobbert's death. I
was so stunned that I said nothing, and for that I have always been sorry.
I understood their reaction, but I should have said something. I should
have protested: "No! Don't do that. Whatever you feel about his crimes,
don't applaud. This is not a game, it's not us against them. It's us against
us."
Dobbert, Jr. deserved punishment not because he was bad but because
he did bad. He assaulted his children so terribly that he challenged the very
idea of human value. His challenge required a strong, punitive response.
Yet we must resist the temptation of the Hollywood crime movie, with its
pandering to bloodlust. We punish offenders not because they stand outside
of society, not because they are alien enemies, but because they are fun-
damentally like the rest of us. The argument from meaning illustrates the
way in which all humans are engaged in a struggle to become moral. The
argument supports the common belief that persons like Dobbert, Jr. deserve
punishment, but not the belief that they lack value. Distinguishing between
these beliefs constitutes the most difficult, and perhaps most important
aspect of determining what punishment is deserved.
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